President Donald Trump鈥檚 choice to launch a joint military campaign with Israel against Iran represents the crowning achievement of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu鈥檚 decades-long campaign to court the Republican Party鈥檚 most conservative elements. But like the attack on Iran itself, that may prove a short-term success with heavy long-term costs.
Over Netanyahu鈥檚 three decades at the center of Israeli politics, support for Israel has plummeted among rank-and-file Democrats in America, which has liberated a new generation of party leaders to forcefully criticize Israel. Now, the Iran war threatens to widen an incipient generational divide within the GOP.
On the ideological fringes of both parties, criticism of Israel does bleed into overt antisemitism 鈥 and the war is already elevating the risk of attacks on Jewish institutions. But it is wishful thinking to assert, as conservative Jewish leaders often do, that antisemitism is the principal force eroding Israel鈥檚 standing with the American public. It is Israel鈥檚 own choices, primarily under Netanyahu, that bear that responsibility.
Some conflict was inevitable between a U.S. Democratic Party (and an American Jewish community) grounded in the left and an Israeli electorate that has mostly moved right since the 1990s. But Netanyahu has systematically widened that divide by consistently and almost exclusively cultivating the American right. 鈥淣etanyahu decided 20 years ago that evangelical Christians, conservative Jews and the Republicans were his natural constituency, and he鈥檚 given up. He doesn鈥檛 care about the rest,鈥 says Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and former top State Department adviser on the Middle East.
To win his first election as prime minister in 1996, Netanyahu recruited Arthur Finkelstein, a legendary strategist among the Republican far right. Once in office, Netanyahu commissioned a study by a group of U.S. neoconservatives that urged both 鈥渁 clean break鈥 from the Palestinian peace process and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Netanyahu clashed so vehemently with Democratic President Bill Clinton over his push for a two-state peace agreement that Clinton famously left his first meeting with the Israeli leader angrily declaring 鈥渨ho鈥檚 the f---ing superpower here?鈥
Netanyahu鈥檚 relations were equally stormy with President Barack Obama. Netanyahu, by then in his second stint as prime minister, mounted a sustained public campaign against Obama鈥檚 attempt to reach a negotiated agreement with Iran over its nuclear program. In 2015, Netanyahu starkly violated diplomatic protocol when he accepted, without consulting the White House, an invitation from House Republicans to address a joint session of Congress 鈥 where he again denounced the emerging nuclear deal.
President Joe Biden took office reflecting the protective instinct of an older generation of Democrats toward Israel. After the horrific Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist attack, Biden pursued a 鈥渉ug Bibi鈥 strategy of seeking to influence the Israeli prime minister by staying close to him, while resisting the growing Democratic Party backlash against the ferocity of Israel鈥檚 response in Gaza. That approach left Biden with the worst of all worlds. His support of Netanyahu alienated liberal and Arab-American voters, but he could (or would) not compel the Israeli leader to end the war in Gaza.
Netanyahu鈥檚 relationship with Trump has had its own bumps, but they have come together to unleash an unprecedented military assault against Iran and its proxies. The debate over whether Netanyahu led Trump into war or vice versa misses the larger point: Biden and Obama both rejected similar entreaties from the Israeli Prime Minister, as former Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently told Bloomberg Television. Trump always had the option of just saying no.
Trump鈥檚 decision to proceed comes when Israel鈥檚 political support in the U.S. is at its lowest in decades. In polling by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs published in January, the share of Americans expressing favorable views toward Israel has fallen significantly since the 1970s. And in February, Gallup recorded a striking milestone. For the first time in its polling on this subject, which dates back to 2002, more Americans said they sympathized with the Palestinians than with Israel.
Israel鈥檚 support has declined most among Democrats, especially younger ones. In 2002, three times as many Democrats said they sympathized with Israel as the Palestinians; that has now more than flipped, with nearly four times as many Democrats sympathizing with the Palestinians. Among younger Democrats, the gap is nearly seven-to-one, according to detailed results provided by Gallup. Similarly, in a Quinnipiac University poll conducted earlier this month, about seven-in-ten Democrats younger than 50, and six-in-ten older than 50, said the U.S. was 鈥渢oo supportive鈥 of Israel, according to results provided by the pollster.
But cracks are also emerging in Israel鈥檚 standing with younger Republicans. In Gallup polling, Republicans aged 18-34 side with Israel over the Palestinians by only about two-to-one (52%-25%), compared to eight-to-one among younger Republicans in 2008 and 10-to-one among Republicans 55 and older today. In the Quinnipiac survey, 37% of Republicans younger than 50 said the U.S. was 鈥渢oo supportive鈥 of Israel 鈥 four times the share of older Republicans.
If costs from the Iran war continue rising 鈥 particularly if it contributes to a midterm wipe-out for Republicans 鈥 it鈥檚 easy to imagine more GOP voters joining the handful of prominent MAGA media commentators now loudly questioning the U.S. alliance with Israel.
There is virtually no chance the next Democratic president will support Israel as unreservedly as Biden did. Given these trends in the GOP electorate, the more relevant question is whether the next Republican president will partner with Israel as closely as Trump has. As Miller notes, over Israel鈥檚 first 50 years, bipartisan U.S. political support was 鈥渢he adhesive鈥 that secured its 鈥渆xtraordinary partnership鈥 with the U.S. Netanyahu long ago decided he didn鈥檛 need strong ties with both American political parties. The result may be that Israel ends up with stable backing from neither.
